Dhruva Bhaskar
Asst Professor
Zicklin School of Business
Department: Bert Wasserman Dept Eco & Fin
Areas of expertise:
Email Address: dhruva.bhaskar@baruch.cuny.edu
> View CV- Biography
- Teaching
- Research and Creative Activity
- Grants
- Honors and Awards
- Service
Education
Ph.D., Economics, New York University United States
B.A., Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Oxford Oxford U.K.
| Semester | Course Prefix | Course Number | Course Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fall 2023 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Fall 2023 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Fall 2022 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Fall 2022 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Fall 2021 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Fall 2021 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Spring 2021 | ECO | 1001 | Micro-Economics |
| Spring 2021 | ECO | 3140 | Game Theory |
Journal Articles
Bhaskar, D. (2024). Dynamic Screening and the Dual Roles of Monitoring. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. D. (2023). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. American Economic Review,
Presentations
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A. (2024, September 25). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. Harvard/MIT Seminar in Economic Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A. (2024, June 25). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A. (2024, July 25). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory. Stony Brook University: Game Theory Society.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2023, January 7). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society. New Orleans: Econometric Soceity.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. UCLA: Econometric Society.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A. (2024, September 25). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. NYU Stern IO Day. NYU Stern School of Business: NYU.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A. (2024, August 25). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop. Stanford University: Stanford University.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2024, September 25). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. NRET Fest. New York University: New York University.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2024, December 25). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. Minnesota Finance Department Junior Finance Conference. University of Minnesota Carlson School of Management: University of Minnesota.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2021, January 5). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. ASSA 2021 Annual Meeting. Online: American Economic Association.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2021, July 22). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. GAMES 2020 Conference. Online: Game Theory Society.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2021, March 3). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. Canadian Economic Theory Conference. Online: Canadian Economic Theory Conference.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2020, February 13). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. Seminar. London, U.K.: Queen Mary University of London.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2020, January 28). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. Seminar. New York, NY: Baruch College.
Bhaskar, D. (2019, May 7). The Dual Roles of Monitoring. Seminar. London, U.K.: University College London.
Bhaskar, D., McClellan, A., & Sadler, E. (2019, October 30). Regulation Design in Insurance Markets. Seminar. Coventry, U.K.: University of Warwick.
Bhaskar, D., & Sadler, E. (2018, June 24). Resource Allocation with Positive Externalities. North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. Davis, CA: Econometric Society.
Bhaskar, D. (2018, January 19). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. Seminar. Mexico City, Mexico: ITAM.
Bhaskar, D. (2018, January 31). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. Seminar. London, U.K.: Royal Holloway, University of London.
Bhaskar, D. (2018, January 25). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. Seminar. Florence, Italy: European University Institute.
Bhaskar, D. (2018, June 22). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society. David, CA: Econometric Society.
Bhaskar, D. (2017, August 4). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University.
Bhaskar, D. (2016, July 24). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. GAMES 2016. Maastricht, Netherlands: Maastricht University.
Bhaskar, D. (2016, May 26). The Value of Monitoring in Dynamic Screening. Seminar. Haifa, Israel: University of Haifa.
Other Scholarly Works
Bhaskar, D., & Sadler, E. D. (2021). Resource Allocation with Positive Externalities.
In Progress.Bhaskar, D. (2021). Dynamic Inspection and the Value of Information.
In Progress.Research Currently in Progess
Bhaskar, D., Ravi, N., & Richter, M.(n.d.). Optimal Allocation with Intermediate Information. In Progress.
We study the design of mechanisms without transfers that allocate an enterprise between agents who have private information about the probability that the enterprise succeeds if given to them (their type). Once the enterprise is initially allocated to one agent, the designer observes the success or failure of the enterprise, after which he decides to let the agent continue with the enterprise, or strip him of the rights. Agents find it desirable to have the rights to the enterprise independent of its success or failure, while the designer only benefits if the enterprise succeeds. A mechanism consists of two allocation rules: the initial allocation to one of the agents, and the ex-post allocation decision. In the optimal mechanism, there is pooling at the top: if there are any agents with type above half, the mechanism randomly allocates between them. Upon the realisation of a failure, these types never get to keep the enterprise. There is also pooling at the bottom: there is a cutoff type such that if all agents are below, the mechanism randomly allocates between them. If there is a failure, these types keep the rights with some probability, the highest of any types. In the middle, there is efficient separation: if all types are below half, and there is some type above the cutoff, the mechanism allocates to the highest such type with probability one. In this region, the probability of keeping the enterprise following a failure is smoothly decreasing in type. As an application, we consider the allocation of the rights to host a major sporting event to countries. For example, FIFA allocating the rights to host the World Cup, or the IOC allocating the Olympics.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A.(n.d.). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. In Progress.
We study optimal regulation of a dynamic job market in which firms are matched with workers over time, and can offer long-term employment contracts. Firms and workers have idiosyncratic match productivity, which is privately observed by firms. The regulator can design the set of permitted contracts from which firms can make offers, and aims to maximize a weighted sum of worker and firm welfare. We derive an optimal regulatory policy in which all contracts take a simple structure, comprising a signing bonus, a constant effort level, a flat wage, and a termination fee if the worker wishes to leave the relationship. The policy links the permitted effort, wage and termination fee to incentivize firms to offer higher wages to workers with better match productivity. Properly designed termination fees introduce frictions into the market which improve worker welfare: firms share surplus with workers as they are protected from other firms poaching employees. Wage restrictions result in a binding minimum wage which creates early-career unemployment, but improves worker welfare by reducing firm information rents.
Bhaskar, D., & McClellan, A.(n.d.). Regulating Dynamic Contracts. In Progress.
We study optimal regulation of a dynamic job market in which firms are matched with workers over time, and can offer long-term employment contracts. Firms and workers have idiosyncratic match productivity, which is privately observed by firms. The regulator can design the set of permitted contracts from which firms can make offers, and aims to maximize a weighted sum of worker and firm welfare. We derive an optimal regulatory policy in which all contracts take a simple structure, comprising a signing bonus, a constant effort level, a flat wage, and a termination fee if the worker wishes to leave the relationship. The policy links the permitted effort, wage and termination fee to incentivize firms to offer higher wages to workers with better match productivity. Properly designed termination fees introduce frictions into the market which improve worker welfare: firms share surplus with workers as they are protected from other firms poaching employees. Wage restrictions result in a binding minimum wage which creates early-career unemployment, but improves worker welfare by reducing firm information rents.
| Title | Funding Agency Sponsor | Start Date | End Date | Awarded Date | Total Funding | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regulation Design | PSC-CUNY 54 | 07/01/2023 | 06/30/2024 | 04/18/2023 | 3500 | Funded - In Progress |
| Optimal Allocation with Stochastic Verification | PSC CUNY 53 | 07/01/2022 | 06/30/2023 | 04/15/2022 | 3500 | Funded - In Progress |
| Collaborative Research: Regulation Design | National Science Foundation | 09/01/2024 | 08/31/2027 | 279279 | Submitted for Review |
University
| Committee Name | Position Role | Start Date | End Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Economics Recruiting Committee | Committee Member | 11/15/2022 | Present |
| Economics Recruiting Committee | Committee Member | 12/1/2021 | Present |
Professional
| Organization | Position Role | Organization State | Organization Country | Start Date | End Date | Audience |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Economic Review | Reviewer, Journal Article | 12/12/2016 | Present | International | ||
| American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | Reviewer, Journal Article | 2/4/2023 | Present | International | ||
| Journal of Mathematical Economics | Reviewer, Journal Article | 1/6/2022 | Present | International | ||
| Games and Economic Behavior | Reviewer, Journal Article | 12/14/2022 | Present | International | ||
| Economic Theory | Reviewer, Journal Article | 9/11/2023 | Present | International | ||
| RAND Journal of Economics | Reviewer, Journal Article | 10/13/2022 | Present | International |