Igor Vaysman

Assc Professor

Zicklin School of Business

Department: Stan Ross Dept Accountancy

Areas of expertise:

Email Address: igor.vaysman@baruch.cuny.edu

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Biography
Teaching
Research and Creative Activity
Grants
Honors and Awards
Service

Education

Ph.D., Accounting, Stanford University

B.S., Business, Trinity University

Semester	Course Prefix	Course Number	Course Name
Fall 2023	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2023	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2022	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2022	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2021	BUS	5000	Independent Study BUS I
Fall 2021	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2021	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2020	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2020	ACC	2203	Prin Mag ACC Nonmajo
Fall 2019	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2019	ACC	3200	Cost Accounting
Fall 2018	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2017	ACCT	98110	Manag Acct Thry & Pract
Spring 2017	ACC	3200	Cost Accounting
Spring 2017	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2016	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2016	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2016	ACCT	98110	Manag Acct Thry & Pract
Spring 2016	ACC	9991	Special Topics in Accountancy
Fall 2015	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2015	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2014	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2014	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2013	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2013	ACCT	98110	Manag Acct Thry & Pract
Spring 2013	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2012	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2011	ACC	9115	Managerial Accounting
Fall 2010	ACC	9115	Managerial Accounting
Fall 2010	ACC	9115	Managerial Accounting
Spring 2010	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Fall 2009	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Summer 2009	ACC	3200	Cost Accounting
Spring 2009	MBA	9110	Executive MBA Mod C
Spring 2009	MBA	9110	Executive MBA Mod C
Fall 2008	ACC	9100	Fin & Mgt Accounting
Fall 2008	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2008	ACC	9811	Manag Acc Theory Prc
Spring 2008	ACC	3200H	Honors - Cost Accounting
Fall 2007	ACC	3200	Cost Accounting
Spring 2007	ACC	3200	Cost Accounting

Journal Articles

Vaysman, I., Bertomeu, J., & Xue, W. (2021). Voluntary versus Mandatory Disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies, 26(2). 425 - 467.

Vaysman, I., Baldenius, T., & Nezlobin, A. (2016). Managerial Performance Evaluation and Real Options. The Accounting Review, 91(3). 741-766.

(2006). Contracting on the Stock Price and Forward-looking Performance Measures. European Accounting Review, 15(4). 1-20.

(2006). Information Technology, Organizational Design, and Transfer Pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 41. 203-236.

(2001). Cost-system Choice and Incentives-Traditional vs. Activity-based Costing. Journal of Accounting Research, 39(3). 619-641.

(1998). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics , 25. 349-384.

(1996). A Model of Cost-based Transfer Pricing. Review of Accounting Studies, 1. 73-108.

(1994). Self Audits, Penalties, and Taxpayer Compliance. Journal of the American Taxation Association , 63-81.

Book Chapters

(2000). "Using Activity-based Costing to Manage More Effectively". (p. 30). The Business of Government Report Series, PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Case Studies

Vaysman, I., & Hillegeist, S. Coffee Services Company, Case 4 (2022).

Vaysman, I. Omnisport: product mix and transfer prices, Case 3 (2022).

Vaysman, I. Falco Scooters (A), Case 3 (2022).

Vaysman, I. Adapconn Technologies, Inc., Case 10 (2021).

Vaysman, I. Falco Scooters (B), Case 4 (2021).

Vaysman, I. Roomrunner Security Solutions, Case 4 (2020).

Vaysman, I. Western Chipsets (A): Financial Reporting Standards and Incentives, Case 5 (2020).

Vaysman, I. Transfer Pricing and Incentives, Case 6 (2018).

Vaysman, I. Snap Contract Manufacturing Product-profitability Analysis, Case 4 (2015).

Vaysman, I. LTC Transfer Pricing and Divisional Performance Evaluation, Case 3 (2012).

Vaysman, I. Management Accounting and Industry Cycles, Surface Mount Technologies (A) 14 (2009).

Vaysman, I., & Smythe, S. Infinity Bank (A): Retail Branches and Customer Profitability, ECCH, INSEAD 12 (2009).

Presentations

Vaysman, I., & Yoon, D. (2024, March 11). Screening Employees Using Stock Options with Early Vesting Period. Invited Presentation at the 2024 Columbia Accounting Theory Conference. Columbia University, New York, NY

Vaysman, I., & Yoon, D. (2024, May 11). Stock-option Compensation: Short or Long Vesting Periods?. Invited Presentation. The University of Texas at San Antonio: The University of Texas at San Antonio.

Vaysman, I. (2024, March 11). Structuring Incentives using Profits Interests. Invited Presentation. The University of Texas at San Antonio: The University of Texas at San Antonio.

Vaysman, I. (2021, March 31). Measuring and managing customer value in subscription settings. Invited Presentation. Greenwich, Connecticut: Eldridge Industries Conference on Customer Profitability Challenges and Opportunities.

Vaysman, I. (2019, October 4). Internal reporting and incentives in turnarounds. Invited Presentation. New York, NY: SDC Designs.

Vaysman, I. Structuring Incentives using Profits Interests. Providing Incentives for LLC Executives. New York, NY: Eldridge Business Partners LLC.

Vaysman, I. Real Options and Capacity Investments. Guggenheim Partners Financial Analysis Conference. New York: Guggenheim Partners.

Vaysman, I. (2007, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. New York University

Vaysman, I. (2007, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. American Accounting Association SouthEast Regional Conference. Atlanta

Vaysman, I. (2007, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. American Accounting Association Management Accounting Conference. Fort Worth

Vaysman, I. (2007, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. Southern Methodist University

Vaysman, I. (2007, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. Rutgers University, Newark

Vaysman, I. Retail Branches and Customer Profitability. INSEAD.

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. University of Illinois, Chicago

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. University of Virginia, Charlottesville

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. Temple University, Philadelphia

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. Boston University

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. University of Illinois Urbana Champaign

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. Baruch College, New York

Vaysman, I. (2006, December 31). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. Invited Presentation. University of Toronto, Toronto

Vaysman, I. (2005, December 31). Information Technology, Organizational Design, and Transfer Pricing. American Accounting Association Annual Conference. San Francisco

Vaysman, I. (2005, December 31). Information Technology, Organizational Design, and Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. Columbia University, New York

Vaysman, I. (2004, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. Australian Finance and Banking Conference. Sydney

Vaysman, I. (2004, December 31). Information Technology, Organizational Design, and Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. London Business School, London

Vaysman, I. (2003, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. American Accounting Association Annual Conference. Honolulu

Vaysman, I. (2003, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. European Financial Management Association. Helsinki

Vaysman, I. (2002, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. American Accounting Association Annual Conference. San Antonio

Vaysman, I. (2002, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. American Accounting Association Management Accounting Conference. Savannah

Vaysman, I. (2001, December 31). Modeling Transfer Pricing with Bounded Rationality. American Accounting Association Management Accounting Conference. San Antonio

Vaysman, I. (2001, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. Invited Presentation. Emory University, Atlanta

Vaysman, I. (2001, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. Invited Presentation. INSEAD, Fontainbleau

Vaysman, I. (2001, December 31). Delegating Investment Decisions. Invited Presentation. Baylor University, Baylor

Vaysman, I. (2000, December 31). Modeling Transfer Pricing with Bounded Rationality. University of Minnesota Accounting Theory Conference. Minneapolis

Vaysman, I. (2000, December 31). Modeling Transfer Pricing with Bounded Rationality. Invited Presentation. UT Austin, Austin

Vaysman, I. (1999, December 31). Modeling Transfer Pricing with Bounded Rationality. Invited Presentation. University of Chicago, Chicago

Vaysman, I. (1998, December 31). Cost-system Choice and Incentives: Traditional vs. Activity-based Costing. Invited Presentation. University of Chicago, Chicago

Vaysman, I. (1997, December 31). Cost-system Choice and Incentives: Traditional vs. Activity-based Costing. Invited Presentation. University of Michigan, Dearborn

Vaysman, I. (1996, December 31). Cost-system Choice and Incentives: Traditional vs. Activity-based Costing. Invited Presentation. Ohio State University, Columbus

Vaysman, I. (1996, December 31). Cost-system Choice and Incentives: Traditional vs. Activity-based Costing. Invited Presentation. University of California, Berkeley

Vaysman, I. (1996, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Pac Ten Doctoral Consortium. Berkeley

Vaysman, I. (1995, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. American Accounting Association Annual Conference. Washington

Vaysman, I. (1994, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

Vaysman, I. (1994, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. Duke University, Durham

Vaysman, I. (1994, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. Columbia University, New York

Vaysman, I. (1994, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. University of Texas, Austin

Vaysman, I. (1993, December 31). Self-Audits and Taxpayer Compliance. Internal Revenue Service Research Conference. Washington

Vaysman, I. (1993, December 31). A Model of Negotiated Transfer Pricing. Invited Presentation. University of Washington, Seattle

Research Currently in Progess

Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Bargaining in Firms. In Progress.

Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Learning Private Information. In Progress.

Research in accounting, finance, and economics investigates situations where some individuals are better informed than others. Private information is central to work in areas as diverse as contract theory, auction design, taxation, disclosure, executive compensation, industrial organization, and rational expectations. However, little work has been done to consider how individuals choose to acquire private information and knowledge in general. Instead, most work assumes that individuals are simply endowed with private knowledge; only a few papers posit that information acquisition has some (usually fixed) cost. Reality, however, is quite different. Individuals consider the costs and the benefits of acquiring various information; make trade-offs about the cost and the precisions of information; and engage in active learning. I introduce the reality of conscious choices of information acquisition into the analyses of optimal-contract design and disclosure.

Vaysman, I., Mishra, B., & Prasad, A.(n.d.). Sourcing for Supplier Expertise: the Role of Contract Flexibility in Channel Design. In Progress.

Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Testing theories of incentives to scale down or abandon prior investment.. In Progress.

There are several competing theories of incentives required to convince executives to scale down or abandon prior investments. If executives enjoy private benefits of control from assets in place, executives will always demand, and will optimally receive, excess compensation to scale down (Eisfeld and Rampini, 2008). If, instead, the main incentive problem relates to private information about the value of assets in place, excess compensation is optimally required only in some predictable situations. I develop a set of sharp predictions about when and how much excess compensation is optimally required in private-information and private-benefits-of-control scenarios. Using executive compensation data, I determine whether real-world compensation is consistent with either of the current theories.

Vaysman, I., & Yoon, D.(n.d.). Screening Employees Using Stock Options with Early Vesting Periods. In Progress.

Mishra, B., & Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Delegating Investment Decisions. In Progress.

Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Optimal Incentives to Abandon Investments. In Progress.

Vaysman, I., Mishra, B., & Prasad, A.(n.d.). Should Product Quality Decisions be Delegated to Suppliers?. In Progress.

We study optimal contract design for a firm which markets its product and outsources production to a supplier, under two contract regimes: the mandatory regime where it mandates quality levels in the contract, and the flexible regime where it outsources quality decisions to the supplier. The paper underscores the difficulty of designing supply contracts when a firm must contend with suppliers who not only have private information but also superior expertise regarding product quality capabilities. Such expertise disparity is sparsely explored in the literature and poses contracting challenges. We set up a mechanism design problem with information asymmetry and expertise disparity. The latter voids the revelation principle and so we propose an innovative solution procedure. Results show that under expertise disparity and absent implementation costs, the flexible regime outperforms the mandatory regime in increasing the firm and channel profits. Although it entails control loss due to the delegation of product quality decisions, the flexible regime can effectively leverage the supplier's expertise through an optimally designed contract. The paper finds implementable revenue sharing contracts that allow a firm to outsource product quality design to better informed and expert suppliers. It provides an argument for why firms that focus on marketing, to the exclusion of production capabilities, may end up outsourcing even product quality decisions to suppliers.

Vaysman, I.(n.d.). Negotiated Transfer Pricing with Limited Communication. In Progress.

Title	Funding Agency Sponsor	Start Date	End Date	Total Funding	Status
The Value of Enduring Supply-Chain Relationships	PSC-CUNY 41	07/01/2010	06/30/2011	4456.8	Completed
Incentives for Optimal Divestitures	PSC-CUNY 40	06/30/2010	06/30/2010	3200	Completed
Abandonment Options and Executive Compensation	PSC-CUNY 39	07/01/2008	12/31/2009	3000	Completed

Honor / Award	Organization Sponsor	Date Received	Description
Service Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2021
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2021
Curriculum Innovation Award	EY Excellence Fund	2020
Service Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2020
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2020
Summer Research Grant	Zicklin School of Business	2020
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2019
Summer Research Grant	Zicklin School of Business	2019
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2018
Summer Research Grant	Zicklin School of Business	2018
Service Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2017
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2017
Summer Research Grant	Zicklin School of Business	2017
Summer Research Award	Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	2016
Baruch College (CUNY) Zicklin School of Business 2010 Teaching Excellence Award	Baruch College Zicklin School of Business	2010
European Case Awards	ECCH	2009	Winner of best Finance, Accounting, and Control case competition for the "Infinity Bank (A): Retail Branches and Customer Profitability" case.
Professor of the year for MBA Core teaching award, INSEAD		2007
Professor of the year for MBA Core teaching award, INSEAD		2005
The MPA Council Outstanding Professor Award	University of Texas at Austin	1996

College

Committee Name	Position Role	End Date
Zicklin Graduate Curriculum Committee	Committee Member	Present
Academic Director of MS and MBA Accountancy Program	Academic director	Present
Zicklin Graduate Accounting Society	Faculty Advisor	Present
MS in Accountancy Curriculum Committee	Committee Member	Present
Executive Committee -- Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	Committee Member	6/30/2023
Graduate Committee on Academic Standing	Committee Member	7/31/2020
MBA Curriculum Steering Committee	Committee Member	5/1/2018
Executive Committee -- Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	Committee Member	7/31/2017
Executive Committee -- Stan Ross Department of Accountancy	Committee Member	6/30/2011

Professional

Organization	Position Role	Start Date	End Date
SSRN ACCOUNTING THEORY - ANALYTICAL MODELS eJOURNAL	Advisory Board Member	9/1/2018	Present
The Accounting Review	Reviewer, Journal Article	1/1/2007	Present
Review of Accounting Studies	Reviewer, Journal Article	1/1/2007	Present
Management Science	Reviewer, Journal Article	1/1/2007	Present