Michael Richter

Education

Ph.D., Economics, New York University New York United States

B.Sc., Mathematics, University of Chicago

Journal Articles

(2024). Unilateral stability in matching problems. Journal of Economic Theory,

(2022). Games with switching costs and endogenous references. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 17(2). 617-650.

(2021). HOLDING A GROUP TOGETHER: NON-GAME THEORY VERSUS GAME THEORY. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 131(638). 2629-2641.

(2020). Ordinal allocation. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE,

(2020). The permissible and the forbidden. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 188.

(2019). Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 115. 30-47.

(2019). Convex preferences: A new definition. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 14(4). 1169-1183.

(2018). Costly switching from a status quo. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 156. 55-70.

(2018). Aspiration-based choice. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 176. 935-956.

(2017). Embedding convex geometries and a bound on convex dimension. DISCRETE MATHEMATICS, 340(5). 1059-1063.

(2015). Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 105(8). 2570-2594.

(2015). An experiment on aspiration-based choice. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 119. 512-526.

(2014). Fully absorbing dynamic compromise. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 152. 92-104.

(2011). Choosing the two finalists. ECONOMIC THEORY, 46(2). 211-219.